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 Abstract 
 
In the present article, we extend the notion of cultural threat posed by immigrants beyond its 
current conceptualization as symbolic, collective-level threats to American culture and identity.  
Instead, we argue that routine encounters with non-English-speaking immigrants cause many 
individuals to feel threatened because of real barriers to interpersonal communication and 
exchange. We draw upon survey and experimental data to demonstrate that local contact with 
immigrants who speak little to no English, as well as incidental exposure to the Spanish 
language, heighten feelings of cultural threat, which increases anti-immigrant sentiment and 
policy preferences. 
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Call any company with an automated phone system and you will likely hear a recording 
OLNHWKLVRQH³Para continuar en español, oprima el número dos´³WRFRQWLQXHLQ6SDQLVKSUHVV
QXPEHUWZR´7KHVHGD\V$PHULFDQVDUHPRUHOLNHO\WKDQHYHUWREHH[SRVHGWR6SDQLVKLQWKHLU
daily lives. Survey data suggests that newly arriving Hispanic immigrants are largely responsible 
for this phenomenon. A national survey of nearly 3,000 Latinos1 reveals that 62% of first-
generation Hispanic immigrants, or 11 million people,2 speak little to no English in the U.S. 
Among Mexican immigrants this figure is even higher²71% of respondents from six nationally 
representative surveys3 report they lack basic English-language abilities. And, while most 
Latinos acknowledge that they should make some effort to assimilate into American culture, 
40% of Hispanics surveyed in a 2004 study4 stated that it was not necessary to speak English to 
be considered part of American society. In fact, nearly all Latinos (88%) say that it is important 
for future generations living in the U.S. to maintain their ability to speak Spanish.5  
The prevalence of non-English-speaking immigrants in the U.S. has led language to 
occupy a central position within contemporary political debates over immigration and 
multiculturalism. For instance, thirty U.S. states have enacted some form of Official English 
language legislation, and other efforts exist to require (QJOLVKSURILFLHQF\IRUVWDWHGULYHU¶V
licenses, to oppose the renewal of the bilingual ballot clause of the Voting Rights Act, and to end 
bilingual education, in general. The occurrence and persistence of linguistic conflict may be 
linked to the fact that, relative to other countries, the United States is one of the most 
                                               
1
 The Pew Hispanic Center/Kaiser Family Foundation 2002 National Survey of Latinos contained responses from 
2,929 Hispanic adults. See publication #3300. 
2
 )LJXUHEDVHGXSRQWKH$PHULFDQ&RPPXQLW\6XUYH\¶V-year estimates from 2006-2008. 
3
 Data were pooled from six national surveys of Hispanics from 2002 to 2006; see Pew Hispanic Center Report 
³(QJOLVK8VDJHDPRQJ+LVSDQLFVLQWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV´1RYHPEHU 
4
 The Pew Hispanic Center/Kaiser Family Foundation 2004 National Survey of Latinos: Politics and Civic 
Engagement contained responses from 2,288 Latino adults. See publication #7129. 
5
 Pew Hispanic Center/Kaiser Family Foundation 2004 National Survey of Latinos. 
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linguistically homogeneous nations (Thernstrom, 1980), with nearly 82 percent of the population 
claiming to only speak English.6 
The problem for many monolingual Americans is that the presence of non-English 
speakers creates barriers to interpersonal communication and challenges what is perceived to be 
a core aspect of American identity (Citrin, Reingold, & Green, 1990; Citrin & Wright, 2009; 
Schildkraut, 2007). As a result, many individuals experience a degree of disorientation or 
³FXOWXUHVKRFN´2EHUJZLWKRXWHYHUOHDYLQJWKHLUKRPHFRXQWU\$OWKRXJKJHQHUDOO\
thought to affect travelers, immigrants, or refugees, culture shock theoretically can afflict anyone 
WKDWKDVDQ³DEVHQFHRUGLVWRUWLRQRIIDPLOLDUHQYLURQPHQWDODQGVRFLDOFXHV´:DUG%RFKQHU	
Furnham 2001, p. 65). We argue that exposure to culturally unfamiliar stimuli ZLWKLQRQH¶V
habituated environment²in this case, the Spanish language²may threaten citizens and cause 
them to experience some degree of emotional disturbance.   
A central aim of the present article is to advance our understanding of the sources of anti-
immigrant sentiment by contributing to the theoretical development of the concept of cultural 
threat.  We push the notion of the cultural threat posed by immigrants beyond its current 
conceptualization and operationalization as collective level threats to American identity and its 
related symbols.  Rather, we argue that experiences of cultural disorientation, stemming from 
local contact with non-English-speaking immigrants and experienced barriers to intergroup 
communication and exchange, constitute realistic and personal dimensions of the cultural threat 
of immigration faced by many Americans.  Scholars working in the field have explored public 
attitudes toward language policies (Citrin, Reingold, Walters, & Green, 1990; Huddy & Sears, 
1995; Schatz, Sullivan, Flannigan, & Black, 2002; Schildkraut, 2001); yet, there is little 
empirical work focusing on the effects of personal contact with linguistically unassimilated 
                                               
6
 Figures obtained from the 2000 U.S. Decennial Census. 
3 
 
immigrants and actual exposure to foreign language on attitudes toward immigration.  In the 
present study, we draw upon survey and experimental data to demonstrate that frequent contact 
with immigrants who speak little to no English, as well as incidental interpersonal and 
impersonal exposure to the Spanish language, serve as important sources of anti-immigrant 
sentiment and policy support. 
Threat and Immigration 
One prominent framework for understanding the causes of anti-immigration attitudes is 
the conceptual distinction between two classes of threat, namely realistic and symbolic threats 
(Citrin et al., 1990; Sniderman, Hagendoorn, & Prior, 2004; Stephan, Ybarra, & Rios Morrison, 
2009). Realistic threats emerge from competition over scarce resources, the loss of which can 
KXUW D JURXS¶V VWDWXV RU ZHOO-being (Bobo 1983, 1988; Sherif, 1966; Sherif, Harvey, White, 
Hood, & Sherif 1961). In terms of immigration, realistic threats primarily come in the form of 
job competition and reduced wages (Espenshade & Calhoun, 1993; Olzak, 1992; Stephan, 
Ybarra, & Bachman, 1999), as well as the consumption of government services and increased 
taxes (Passel & Fix, 1994; Stephan et al., 1999). Interestingly, political scientists have found 
mixed evidence for the role of realistic threats in shaping opinion on immigration.  Objective 
measures such as income, occupational field, employment status, and local unemployment rates 
often fail to exert statistically significant effects on immigration policy preferences (Citrin et al., 
1997; Campbell, Wong, and Citrin, 2006; Hood and Morris, 1997). In contrast, subjective 
measures, such as pessimistic sociotropic evaluations and perceived threats to the national 
economy stand as consistent predictors of opposition to immigration (Espenshade and 
Hempstead, 1996; Citrin et al., 1997; Burns and Gimpel, 2000; Sniderman et al., 2004).     
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Symbolic threats, by comparison, concern violatioQVWRDJURXS¶VFRUHVHWRIEHOLHIV
values, cultural norms, or identities (Citrin et al. 1990; Kinder & Sears, 1981; Sears, 1988; 
Stephan et al., 1999). For instance, individuals may feel threatened by Hispanic immigrants, who 
are seen as putting little effort into embracing American culture and identity (Huntington, 2004).  
The identification of threat to culture as a distinct category of concern over immigration has its 
intellectual roots in the study of nativism. The belief that specific immigrant groups will fail to 
assimilate due to their ethnicity, religion, or culture of origin, and thus $PHULFDQV¶fears that 
their culture will be contaminated or displaced, is a defining feature of American nativism 
(Bennet, 1988; Higham, 1985; Schrag, 2010). Measures of symbolic threat and concern over the 
cultural impacts of immigration serve as consistent predictors of antipathy toward immigrants 
(Sniderman et al., 2004) and support for restrictive immigration policies (Citrin et al., 1990, 
Citrin et al., 1997; Hood and Morris, 1997).  Further, such measures have been found to be 
prepotent sources of opinion on immigration, often trumping rival measures of perceived 
economic threat in multivariate analyses (Citrin et al., 1997; Sniderman et al., 2004; Sides and 
Citrin, 2007).   
Clearly, research utilizing these concepts of threat has been useful in advancing our 
understanding of the sources of individual opinion on immigration. However, we believe there 
are two important and related limitations in the way researchers currently conceptualize cultural 
threat.  First, theorization about cultural threats stemming from immigration has occurred largely 
in symbolic terms, involving group-level conflict over abstract or intangible objects. Standard 
measures of symbolic WKUHDWLQFOXGHLWHPVVXFKDV³LPPLJUDWLRQIURP/DWLQ$PHULFDLV
XQGHUPLQLQJ$PHULFDQFXOWXUH´RU³+LVSDQLFLPPLJUDQWVVKRXOGOHDUQWRFRQIRUPWRWKHUXOHV
DQGQRUPVRI$PHULFDQVRFLHW\´6WHSKDQHWDO:HEHOLHYHWKDWWKLVUHVHDUFKKDV
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overlooked a variety of non-economic, yet realistic, aspects of immigration that could serve as 
important sources of anti-immigrant sentiment. 
In their ³)LWWLQJ-,Q([SHULPHQW´for instance, Sniderman and colleagues (2004) 
manipulate whether a new immigrant group speaks Dutch fluently, as well as the degree to which 
this group will likely assimilate into Dutch culture. The authors report that subjects in the 
³LPPLJUDQWVGRQRWVSHDN'XWFKDQGDUHQRWOLNHO\WRILWLW´FRQGLWLRQDUHPRUHOLNHO\WRRSSRVH
new immigration than those in a control condition. While this finding is generally interpreted as 
demonstrating the effects of symbolic, group-level threats on national identity, the results from 
this experiment could just as easily be viewed as evidence that Dutch citizens had personal, 
pragmatic concerns about coming into contact with linguistically unfamiliar immigrants. From 
this perspective, native born citizens may well be worried about something very realistic²that 
is, the ability to effectively communicate and comfortably interact with outgroup members in 
their local communities.   
A second, related limitation of political science research on the concept of cultural threat 
is the failure to consider threats that operate at the individual or personal level. Instead, the focus 
of existing research has been almost entirely at the group level²that is, interactions between 
Hispanic immigrants and Americans as a whole. Although several studies differentiate between 
collective and personal economic threats (Citrin et al. 1997; Burns & Gimpel, 2000; Sniderman 
et al., 2004), no research contains measures of cultural threat at the individual level. Sniderman 
and colleagues JRVRIDUDVWRVWDWHWKDW³DWKUHDWWRDJURXS¶VLGHQWLW\DQGZD\RIOLIHLQKHUHQWO\
is a collective thUHDW´p.37). Once again, we believe that this group-level focus ignores 
real concerns that individuals have about being able to interact and communicate with 
unassimilated, non-English-speaking, immigrants living in their communities. 
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To address these limitations in the literature, we extend the existing concept of cultural 
threat by developing and empirically assessing a theory emphasizing the tangible and personal 
dimensions of the cultural impacts of immigration. To this end, we draw upon research on 
acculturation and adaptation, assimilationist threat, and language-based exclusion to ground our 
theory.  More specifically, we argue that GLUHFWSHUVRQDOH[SRVXUHLQRQH¶VKDELWXated 
environment to an unfamiliar culture and language²in this case, Hispanic culture and the 
Spanish language²may generate feelings of cultural disorientation, negative emotions, and 
reduced sociocultural competence, which ultimately causes threat.  Feelings of threat, in turn, 
should color perceptions of immigrants and influence attitudes regarding policies geared toward 
immigration. To clarify, the key contribution of our conception of cultural threat is its focus on 
the individual native-born member of an immigrant-receiving country, and his or her reactions to 
real encounters with culturally unassimilated immigrants who speak a foreign language. In the 
section that follows, we briefly review three veins of research that provide a basis for 
understanding what these personal experiences are, why they are threatening, and how they 
should influence immigration attitudes. 
Foreign Language Exposure and the Experience of Threat 
One basis for placing foreign language exposure at the center of a theory of concrete and 
personal cultural threat comes from work on acculturation and psychological adaptation (Castro, 
2003). From this perspective, immigration entails intercultural contact, where members of 
distinct cultural groups engage with one another on a consistent basis. Over time, these 
individuals incorporate culturally distinct elements from each other into their own culture 
through a process of exchange known as acculturation (Redfield, Linton, & Herskovits, 1936). 
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Acculturation is characterized by the displacement of the original cultural patterns of a group, 
followed by a period of cultural adjustment and change. 
A primary concern to researchers on acculturation is individual adaptation, which can be 
YLHZHGDVWKHOHYHORI³ILW´EHWZHHQWKHLQGLYLGXDOZKRVHHQYLURQPHQWLVXQGHUJRLQJFXOWXUDO
change, and the surrounding sociocultural environment (Berry & Sam, 1997; Castro, 2003). The 
literature suggests that individual reactions to cultural change can result in positive or negative 
adaptation outcomes (Berry, 1997; Berry & Sam, 1997). We argue that one key to understanding 
how immigration and intercultural contact can be culturally threatening is to discern how 
individuals adapt to residing within an acculturating context.  Of primary concern for our present 
theory is the experience of negative outcomes associated with sociocultural adaptation 
Sociocultural adaptation depends upon the possession of the social and cultural skills or 
competencies necessary to deal with everyday social situatioQVDQGGHPDQGVLQRQH¶VLPPHGLDWH
context. Sociocultural competence involves the ability to interact effectively and comfortably 
with cultural outgroup members, which presupposes both sensibility to the beliefs, values, and 
norms of the cultural outgroup, as well as the ability to effectively communicate with its 
members (La Fromboise, Coleman, & Gerton, 1993; Castro, 2003). These skills affect the ease 
with which an individual navigates their surrounding sociocultural environment and 
accomplishes their goals, such as performing tasks, making friends, participating in social 
activities, and understanding and communicating with others (Ward & Rana-Deuba, 1999).  
Negative adaptation outcomes are primarily indicated by trouble understanding outgroup beliefs, 
customs, and behaviors, as well as difficulty effectively communicating and interacting with 
outgroup members. Language is posited as a recurrent and core component of sociocultural 
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competence, and communication barriers, in turn, comprise an important basis for the erosion of 
RQH¶VVHQVHRIVRFLRcultural competence.   
According to this theoretical framework, individuals become vulnerable to losing their 
REWDLQHGOHYHOVRIVRFLRFXOWXUDODGDSWDWLRQDQGH[SHULHQFH³FXOWXUHVKRFN´2EHUJ%RFN
³ODQJXDJHVKRFN´6PDOOH\RU³DFFXOWXUDWLYHVWUHVV´%HUU\7) with the 
emergence and continued presence of unfamiliar culture and the displacement of the original 
FXOWXUDOFRPSRVLWLRQRIRQH¶VVXUURXQGLQJHQYLURQPHQW)RUQDWLYH-born Americans, who are 
generally only proficient in English, coming into direct contact with non-English speaking 
immigrants in their own community should produce a realistic and personal cultural threat. This 
threat should originate from reduced sociocultural adaptation, with the presumed mechanism 
being exposure to foreign language, the presence of language barriers, and experienced difficulty 
performing everyday tasks and communicating with cultural outgroup members.  
 This theoretical expectation is in line with recent work on assimilationist threat and 
language-based social exclusion. The theory of assimilation threat (Paxton & Mughan, 2006) 
suggests that the failure of immigrants to assimilate core aspects of American culture constitutes 
a concrete form of cultural threat. Through analysis of focus group data, Paxton and Mughan 
(2006) conclude that there exists a widely shared hierarchy of expectations among Americans 
regarding the assimilation behavior of immigrants, with the most important behaviors being non-
negotiable. Accordingly, the ability to speak English lies at the core of whDW³EOHQGLQJLQWR
$PHULFDQVRFLHW\´PHDQVIRU$PHULFDQV%H\RQGILQGLQJWKDWWKHYDVWPDMRULW\RIUHVSRQGHQWVLQ
their survey agreed that immigrants need to communicate effectively in English in their daily 
lives, Paxton and Mugham also report that a majority of respondents believed that immigrants 
should speak in English when in public places and in the presence of Americans.  Several 
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participants in the focus group studies registered strong complaints over experiencing difficulty 
in completing basic day-to-day tasks or interpersonal exchanges²such as placing an order at a 
fast food restaurant²due to encountering immigrants with limited English language ability. 
Such experiences, and the frustration they engender, reinforce the identification of foreign 
language exposure, experienced language barriers, and threatened sociocultural competence, as a 
realistic and personal dimensions of the cultural threat of immigration.  
In addition to complaints over the experience of language barriers, one participant in the 
focus group study confessed that being around immigrants who speak another language appears 
DUURJDQWDQGUXGHDQGDQRWKHUVWDWHGLWPDGHKHUIHHOH[FOXGHGDQGXQLPSRUWDQW³OLNH\RX¶UHQRW
HYHQWKHUH´S  This response among focus group participants corresponds with 
recent research on language-based social exclusion (Hitlan, Kelly, Schepman, Schneider, & 
Zárate, 2006; Hitlan, Kelly, & Zárate, 2010). Research on social exclusion has demonstrated that 
experiences such as being ignored, unwanted, or rejected can lead to anger and aggressive 
behavior (Leary, Kock, & Hechenbliekner, 2001), decreased liking for group members (Pepitone 
& Wilpizeski, 1960), increased desire to avoid future contact with individuals responsible for the 
social exclusion (Cheuk & Rosen, 1994), and active derogation of those who engage in the 
rejection (Bourgeois & Leary, 2001).  Building on this, scholars demonstrate that language-based 
social exclusion results in augmented intergroup distinctions, increased percHSWLRQRI³REVWDFOHV´
to the ingroup posed by the outgroup (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005), and increased anger toward the 
outgroup (Desteno, Dasgupta, Bartlett, & Cajdric, 2004). For instance, Hitlan et al. (2006) find 
that language-based ostracism within the workplace results in decreased organizational 
commitment, increased perception of symbolic threat, and increased prejudice toward 
immigrants. A more recent study finds that language-based ostracism outside the workplace (and 
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in a fabricated experimental social group setting) leads to increased prejudice toward immigrants 
via anger and perceived social distance (Hitlan et al., 2010). 
Taken together, these three veins of work provide a strong theoretical foundation for a 
realistic theory of cultural threat that emphasizes contact with linguistically unassimilated 
immigrants and experienced barriers to interpersonal communication and exchange.  In addition 
to extending our notion of cultural threat beyond its current group-level, symbolic 
conceptualization, our theory contributes to the opinion literature by adding an important 
component to our theorization of the causal process leading to anti-immigrant sentiment and 
policy support. A large portion of the opinion research focuses on the impact of cognitively-
based perceptual variables (e.g., subjective economic evaluations and perceived economic and 
cultural threats, etc.) on immigration policy attitudes (Burns and Gimpel, 2000; Citrin et al., 
1990; Espenshade and Hempstead, 1996; Esses, Jackson, and Armstrong, 1998; Sniderman et al., 
2004; Stephan et al., 2009).  Within this research, the causal chain is theorized to move from 
perceived threat to policy attitude, with a noticeable gap in exploring the factors that precede 
threat perceptions.   
There are a few exceptions to this gap in the literature; for example, Fetzer (2000) and 
Sniderman et al. (2004) explore factors underlying the perception of economic and cultural 
threat, but these studies generally do not test whether ethnic context or contact with immigrants 
serve as antecedents for the perception of threat. Citrin et al. (1990) and Hood and Morris (1997) 
ILQGWKDWWKDWFLWL]HQV¶SHUFHSWLRQVUHJDUGLQJWKHLPSDFWRIDJURZLQJ+LVSDQLFSRSXODWLRQ
including the perceived cultural impacts, was significantly more negative among those residing 
in counties with higher percentages of Hispanics.  Further, in both studies, the perceived impact 
of the Hispanic population had a powerful effect on immigration policy preferences, suggesting a 
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mediated causal process²where context influences perceptions, which in turn influence policy 
attitudes. Building on these findings, we seek to extend our understanding of the processes 
leading to anti-immigrant policy preferences by identifying personal contact and foreign 
language exposure as concrete factors and experiences that precede the perception of threat, and 
WKXVPRYHXV³IXUWKHUEDFN´LQWKHFDXVDOFKDLQ 
In sum, our theoretical framework merges insights from research on acculturation and 
adaptation, assimilationist threat, and language-based social exclusion to generate well-grounded 
expectations regarding the impact of contact with non-English-speaking immigrants and foreign 
ODQJXDJHH[SRVXUHRQ$PHULFDQV¶RSLQLRQVRQ immigration. This framework pushes the current 
conceptualization of cultural threat beyond group-level, abstract threats by focusing on 
experienced barriers to interpersonal communication and exchange as realistic and personal 
dimensions of cultural threat. According to our theory, personal contact with non-English-
VSHDNLQJLPPLJUDQWVZLWKLQRQH¶VORFDOHQYLURQPHQWDQGH[SRVXUHWRIRUHLJQODQJXDJHZLOOFDXVH
individual Americans to feel culturally threatened, which should in turn, increase opposition to 
immigration. We test our theory with survey-based data, as well as two novel experiments. 
Study 1:  Intercultural Contact and Attitudes toward Immigration 
In the present study, we provide an initial test of our realistic and personal theory of 
cultural threat by assessing the impact of personal contact with immigrants who speak little to no 
(QJOLVKRQ$PHULFDQV¶DWWLWXGHVWRZDUGLPPLJUDWLRQ)LUVWZHK\SRWKHVL]HWKDWIUHTXHQWFRQWDFW
with non-English speakers should enhance the perception among white citizenV¶WKDW
immigration poses a cultural threat.  And second, we hypothesize that by enhancing the 
perceived cultural threat of immigration, contact with linguistically unassimilated immigrants 
should indirectly augment support for restrictive immigration policies. 
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Of course, we would be remiss to ignore the extant research in political science exploring 
the effects of proximate immigrant populations²both in terms of the size and growth²on 
Whites¶ policy preferences. Unfortunately, the findings from this research on ethnic context are 
notoriously mixed.  For example, scholars report that the link between population size and anti-
immigrant sentiment is state-specific (Hood and Morris, 1997), policy specific (Campbell, 
Wong, and Citrin, 2006), confined to specific immigrant groups (Ha, 2010), rooted in the growth 
rather than the size of local immigrant populations (Hopkins, 2010), or varies depending upon 
whether group size is measured at the census-tract versus county level (e.g., see Campbell, 
Wong, and Citrin, 2006; Tolbert and Grummel, 2003) or census-tract versus metropolitan level 
(Oliver and Wong, 2003). Other researchers find non-significant results when testing for the size 
of residentially-SUR[LPDWHLPPLJUDQWJURXSVRQFLWL]HQV¶RSLQLRQV&LWULQHWDO90; Dixon and 
Rosenbaum, 2004; Frendreis and Tatalovich, 1997; Taylor, 1998). Some work even finds that 
residing near a large immigrant population leads to positive attitudes (Fox, 2004; Hood and 
Morris, 1997; Hood and Morris, 2000).   
  Beyond the mixed nature of the findings, one clear limitation of this research is that 
personal contact is not directly observed, but merely assumed, by measures of group size and 
residential proximity.  The problems associated with relying upon contextual measures of group 
size as indicators of actual contact and perceived threat are illustrated by Stein, Post, and Rinden 
(2000), who find diverging effects for measures of ethnic context and actual personal contact 
upon white opinion. More specifically, they find that residing in proximity to a large Hispanic 
population leads to anti-immigrant sentiment among Whites, but only in the absence of personal 
contact with Hispanics.  When actual contact with Hispanics is high, residing near a large 
Hispanic population drastically attenuates group antipathy and support for restrictive 
13 
 
immigration policy.  These findings highlight the importance of distinguishing context from 
contact in theory and measurement and suggest strong caution in relying upon the former as an 
indicator of the latter.  
The primary issue underlying confounding context and contact is that reliance upon 
group population size measures does not enable us to discriminate the possible mechanisms 
linking context to policy opinions.  This issue becomes highly problematic in the presence of 
competing theories stipulating qualitatively distinct mechanisms linking context and presumed 
intergroup contact to policy attitudes.  For example, proximity to a large immigrant community 
could provoke anti-immigrant sentiment by triggering economic competition or activating 
LQGLYLGXDOV¶SUHMXGLFHWRZDUGHWKQLFPLQRULWLHV²as extant theories argue²or because it leads to 
contact with unassimilated immigrants and culture-based barriers to intergroup communication 
and exchange²as our theory stipulates. At bottom line, observing that individual policy opinion 
covaries with the size of an outgroup lends little currency toward confirming or ruling out the 
potential mechanism underlying this relationship. Given the centrality of contact with non-
English-speaking immigrants to the present theory of cultural threat, utilizing direct measures of 
such contact would stand to advance the extant opinion literature by addressing some of its key 
limitations, while also serving to operationalize our theory in a more direct and precise fashion.   
Using a direct measure of interpersonal contact also allows us to better engage with and 
add to the existing research on intergroup contact (Allport, 1954; Brown, 1995), which argues 
that positive contact with outgroup members undermines negative stereotypes and leads to 
positive outgroup evaluations.  The contact hypothesis, which accounts for the findings of Stein 
et al. (2000), clearly counters theories predicting threat and hostility in response to contact with 
outgroups, and needs to be theoretically addressed in developing our contact-based theory of 
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cultural threat.  The theoretical framework underlying our theory of cultural threat accounts for 
the countervailing predictions of contact theory by identifying exposure to unfamiliar culture and 
experienced barriers to interaction and communication as key conditions under which contact 
with cultural outgroups will lead to threat rather than amity.  Indeed, contact theory scholars 
have identified a set of key contextual features which must be present for contact to generate 
positive exposure effects; in the absence of such facilitative conditions, contact is believed to 
exacerbate intergroup conflict (Allport, 1954).  
Within the domain of immigration and intercultural contact, the acculturation and 
adaptation literature, as well as the work on assimilationist threat and language-based social 
exclusion, strongly suggest that the degree of cultural assimilation of the immigrants that citizens 
encounter should condition the effects of contact.  To be sure, leading scholarship suggests that 
conflict between two ethnic groups will not simply be a function of the size of an outgroup group 
or the degree of contact with its members, but of the degree of cultural differences between the 
two groups (Forbes, 1997).  This argument is strongly reinforced by recent work demonstrating 
that white Americans react most negatively to large local Hispanic populations when they are 
culturally unassimilated (Roche and Espino, 2009).  By shaping the degree to which contact 
involves exposure to unfamiliar culture and language, experienced obstacles to completing basic 
WDVNVDQGVRFLDOH[FKDQJHVDQGWKUHDWVWRRQH¶VVHQVHRIVRFLDOFRPSetence, the degree of 
cultural and linguistic assimilation of immigrants should strongly condition the extent to which 
contact activates perceptions of cultural threat, and in turn, triggers support for restrictive 
immigration policies. 
Data and Methods 
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To test our initial hypotheses regarding the effects of personal contact with unassimilated, 
non-English-speaking immigrants, we draw upon a 2006 national survey conducted jointly by 
the Pew Research Center for the People & the Press and the Pew Hispanic Center.  This survey 
specifically focuses on the topic of immigration and contains a total sample size of N=6,003.7 As 
we are primarily interested in the reactions of white Americans toward personal contact with 
non-English-speaking immigrants, we restricted our analyses to the 3,884 survey respondents 
who identified themselves as non-Hispanic and White.   
To measure personal contact with linguistically unassimilated immigrants, we rely upon 
WKHIROORZLQJLWHP³+RZRIWHQGR\RXSHUVRQDOO\FRPHLQFRQWDFWZLWKLPPLJUDQWVZKRVSHDN
OLWWOHWRQR(QJOLVK"´7KLVRUGLQDOvariable has four response options: ³Often´RIZKLWH
respondents), ³VRPHWLPHV´ (28%), ³UDUHO\´ (17%), DQG³QHYHU´ (3%). This variable, contact, was 
recoded to range from 0 to 1 for ease of interpretation, with higher values indicating greater 
contact.  We measure perceptions of cultural threat with an item that asks respondents to select 
the statements that FRPHVFORVHVWWRWKHLURZQYLHZV³7KHJURZLQJQXPEHURIQHZFRPHUVIURP
other countries threaten traditional $PHULFDQFXVWRPVDQGYDOXHV´versus ³7he growing number 
RIQHZFRPHUVIURPRWKHUFRXQWULHVVWUHQJWKHQV$PHULFDQVRFLHW\´Cultural threat is a 
dichotomous measure FRGHG³´LIWKHUHVSRQGHQWVHOHFWHGWKHILUVWVWDWHPHQWDQG³´LIWKH\
selected the second statement.  Of the 3,607 whites in the survey for whom a valid answer was 
recorded, approximately 49% perceive immigrants as posing a collective-level cultural threat.   
We assess the impact of contact on WKLWHV¶LPPLJUDWLRQSROLF\SUHIHUHQFHs with two 
separate policy items.  First, we rely upon a commonly used survey item asking respondents: 
³6KRXOG/(*$/LPPLJUDWLRQLQWRWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVEHNHSWDWLWVSUHVHQWOHYHOLQFUHDVHGRU
                                               
7
 This survey relied upon telephone interviews conducted between February 8th and March 7th, 2006, and contains an 
oversample of adults from Chicago, Las Vegas, Phoenix, Washington D.C., and Raleigh-Durham. 
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GHFUHDVHG"´2XUILUVWSROLF\GHSHQGHQWYDULDEOHamount of immigration, is a three category 
ordered variable rangLQJIURP³´LIWKHUHVSRQGHQWVHOHFWHG³LQFUHDVHG´WR³´LIWKH\VHOHFWHG
³GHFUHDVHG.´7KHVHFRQGSROLF\GHSHQGHQWYDULDEOHWDSVDWWLWXGHVFRQFHUQLQJKRZWKH86
government should address illegal immigrationUHVSRQGHQWVZHUHDVNHG³7KLQNLQJDERXW
immigrants who are now living in the U.S. ILLEGALLY, should illegal immigrants be required 
WRJRKRPHRUVKRXOGWKH\EHJUDQWHGVRPHNLQGRIOHJDOVWDWXVWKDWDOORZVWKHPWRVWD\KHUH"´
Our second policy dependent variable, deport illegals, is dichotomous DQGFRGHG³´LI
UHVSRQGHQWVVXSSRUWUHTXLULQJLOOHJDOVWREHUHWXUQHGWRWKHLUKRPHVDQG³´LIWKH\EHOLHYHGWKH\
should be given some kind of legal status and allowed to stay in the U.S. 
Within each model, we included a number of theoretically relevant individual-level 
control variables.  To control for the role of economic concerns, we included measures of 
household income (1=highest income category), employment status (1=unemployed), as well as 
UHVSRQGHQWV¶VRFLRWURSLFHYDOXDWLRQVRIWKHQDWLRQDOHFRQRmy (1=negative evaluation) and 
evaluations of their own personal financial situation (1=negative evaluation).  Political and 
ideological orientations were incorporated into each model through controls for party 
identification (5 point scale; 1=Republican) and ideological self-identification (1=very 
conservative).  We control for group affect and prejudice, which are known predictors of opinion 
on immigration policy preferences (Burns and Gimpel, 2000; Huddy and Sears, 1995), with an 
item tapping negative affect toward Hispanics and another toward Asians (1=very unfavorable 
attitude toward group).8   
                                               
8
 The Pew Survey contained two separate questionnaire forms randomly administered to survey respondents; 
unfortunately, these two group affect items were only asked on Form 1 of the survey, thus cutting down the number 
of cases included in the analyses by nearly half.  The inclusion or exclusion of the group affect items (and changes 
in the number of cases), did not significantly alter the size, direction, or statistical significance of the coefficient 
estimates for the direct effect of contact on perceived cultural threat, the direct effect of cultural threat on policy 
attitudes, or the indirect effect of contact on policy attitudes. 
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We also include a control for whether the respondent is fluent in a language other than 
English (1=multilingual), with the assumption that multilingualism may serve as a proxy for 
cosmopolitanism and multiculturalism, thus decreasing the likelihood of feeling culturally 
threatened by immigration.  In addition, intergroup contact theory would suggest that having 
immigrants as close friends or family members²in contrast to casual encounters²should 
promote exposure to and familiarity with foreign cultures, reducing the experience of cultural 
threat in response to contact with unassimilated immigrants.  To control for this possibility, we 
included an item that asked respondents whether they have any friends or relatives who are 
recent immigrants (1=has immigrant friends or family). To control for basic demographic 
factors, each model included measures for respondent education, age, gender (1=male), and place 
of birth (1=born in the U.S.).  For ease of interpretation, all variables, except for age, were 
recoded to range from 0 to 1. 
Given our hypotheses that contact will enhance the perception of cultural threat, and thus, 
heighten support for restrictive immigration policies, we need to estimate both the direct and 
mediated effect of contact on policy attitudes. To test these effects, we estimated a structural 
equation model for each policy attitude that simultaneously regressed cultural threat on contact 
(and a set of control variables) and regressed the policy dependent variable on contact, cultural 
threat, and control variables. Due to the ordinal nature of our cultural threat item and dependent 
variables, we used ordered probit link functions for these models and estimated the parameters 
using weighted least squares in the software package Mplus® (Muthén and Muthén 2007).9 
Results 
                                               
9
  &RPPRQPHWKRGVIRUDVVHVVLQJPHGLDWHGHIIHFWVHJ6WDWD¶Vsgmediation command) treat dependent and 
mediating variables as continuous variables, which provide misleading estimates when such variables are 
categorical/ordinal in nature. To address this issue, we utilized structural equation models, which allow for the 
specification of categorical variables (e.g., see Iacobucci, 2008) and provide more accurate statistical tests for 
mediation.   
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As hypothesized, white Americans who report coming into frequent personal contact with 
immigrants who speak little to no English are significantly more likely (than whites lacking such 
personal contact) to perceive immigrants as posing a threat to American culture (see Column I, 
Table I).10  This result provides evidence in support of our argument that direct contact with 
linguistically unassimilated immigrants serves as a source of perceived cultural threat that is both 
tangible and non-symbolic in nature.  In other words, while conceptualized in largely symbolic 
terms, this result reveals that the perception that immigrants threaten the American culture can be 
fostered by tangible and personal interactions with culturally unassimilated immigrants. Further, 
the results of the multivariate analysis demonstrate that the effect of contact is empirically 
distinct from the effects of a slew of alternative factors (e.g., national economic evaluations, 
group affect, ideology, etc.). While this result confirms our hypothesis by providing information 
about the sign and significance of the effect of contact upon the perception of cultural threat, it 
does not lend itself to direct interpretation of the magnitude of the effect. 
To get a better sense of the effect size of our measure of contact, we conducted 
postestimation analyses using predicted probabilities.  One approach for getting the overall feel 
of the magnitude of contact with non-English-speaking immigrants is to assess the change in 
perceived cultural threat among white survey respondents when moving from the minimum to 
the maximum level of contact.  Holding all other variables at their means, the probability of 
being culturally threatened by immigrants among WKLWHVZKRUHSRUW³QHYHU´FRPLQJLQWRFRQWDFW
with non-English speaking immigrants is .38.  In contrast, among Whites who report coming into 
contact ³RIWHQ´with immigrants who speak little to no English, the probability of perceiving 
cultural threats from immigration is .50.  Hence, moving from the lowest to highest level of self-
                                               
10
 Our analyses did not apply survey weights. Given that the survey contained an oversample of individuals from 
several U.S. cities, we compared model results with and without applied survey weights and the directionality and 
significance of the coefficients for contact and cultural threat remained essentially unchanged. 
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reported contact, we observe a 32 percent increase (a net difference of .12) in the probability that 
Whites report feeling culturally threatened.   
Moving on to the results for our immigration policy items (Columns II and III, Table I), 
we see that, in line with prior research, an increase in perceived cultural threat significantly 
increases support for restrictive immigration policies.  In the former case, Whites who perceive 
immigrants as posing cultural threats are more likely to prefer a decrease in the level of 
immigration and a deportation policy for all illegal immigrants.   Looking to the last row of 
Table I, the results for the indirect effect of contact on policy attitudes confirm our hypothesis; 
by increasing the perception that immigrants pose threats to American customs and values, high 
levels of direct contact with non-English-speaking immigrants indirectly enhances support for 
anti-immigrant policies.  In total, these results reveal that variation in the degree of personal 
contact with unassimilated immigrants has a substantively meaningful impact on cultural threat 
perceptions, which in turn, mediates the impact of contact on immigration policy preferences. 
The findings for our control variables are worth giving brief description.  In line with 
prior research, we find mixed support for conventional measures of economic threat.  Across the 
threat and policy attitude models, neither income nor unemployment exerted significant effects.  
Moreover, personal financial evaluations registered no effects, while pessimistic sociotropic 
evaluations significantly enhanced perceived cultural threat and support for decreased levels of 
immigration.  As expected by theories of prejudice, negative affect toward Hispanics and Asians 
both increased the perception of cultural threat, while only the former persisted in predicting 
support for anti-immigration policies. Not surprisingly, conservatives and Republicans are more 
likely to perceive immigrants as posing a cultural threat, and ideological conservatism, but not 
partisan identification, persists as a significant factor shaping policy preferences.  Education, as 
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found in past research, decreased threat perceptions and increased support for more permissive 
policy positions, while age exerted mixed effects²enhancing cultural threat while dampening 
support for deporting illegal immigrants.  Finally, as predicted by intergroup contact theory, 
having a recent immigrant as a friend or family member consistently decreased anti-immigrant 
sentiment, though only achieving statistical significance in the case of preferences over the 
amount of immigration. 
From the standpoint of our language-centered theory of cultural threat, the mechanism 
linking contact with non-English-speaking immigrants to threat perceptions and policy attitudes 
is presumed to be foreign language exposure and feelings of threat in response to experienced 
barriers to interpersonal interaction. While serving as an improvement over models which use 
indirect measures such as group population size, our subjective measure of contact is not without 
its own limitations. One potential concern with the subjective nature of this variable is its 
validity; for example, this measure could be susceptible to being distorted by attitudinal factors 
unrelated to the actual frequency of contact, such as prejudice.   
To explore this possibility, we conducted a regression analysis of self-reported contact.  
Relying upon information obtained from the 2000 Decennial Census, we find that an increase in 
the percent foreign-born ZLWKLQUHVSRQGHQWV¶]LSFRGHOHd to a substantively large and highly 
statistically significant increase in the probability of reporting a high degree of contact with 
immigrants who speak little to no English.  This finding strongly contributes to the validity of 
our measure by demonstrating that variation in self-reported contact with non-English-speaking 
immigrants is strongly tied to variation in the actual immigration population within white survey 
UHVSRQGHQWV¶SUR[LPDWHUHVLGHQWLDOFRQWH[W&RXQWHULQJWKLVILQGLQJKRZHYHUthis analysis also 
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revealed that negative affect toward Hispanics emerged as a significant predictor of contact, 
enhancing the probability of reporting higher levels of contact.11   
As is the case with analyses based upon cross-sectional data, and of particular concern 
given the effect of prejudice toward Hispanics on our measure of contact, we cannot make strong 
conclusions regarding causality.  We are left with a relative inability to conclude whether higher 
levels of contact shape immigration related attitudes, or whether prejudice influences residential 
self-selection, and in the present case, leads to inflated reports of intergroup contact.  By 
capturing individual prejudice toward a key immigrant group, uncovering a relationship between 
self-reported contact and attitudes on immigration may serve, to a certain extent, as an exercise 
in demonstrating that negative attitudes toward an immigrant group predicts negative attitudes 
toward immigrants.  
To address these limitations in our survey analysis, we conducted two experimental 
studies to explore the effect of direct foreign language exposure on WKLWHV¶SHUFHSWLRQRIWKH
threats posed by immigrants, as well as their resulting support for anti-immigration policies.  In 
addition to enabling us to corroborate the mechanisms assumed to operate in our survey findings, 
the use of random assignment in determining the receipt of our experimental treatments allows 
us to determine the causal links among foreign language exposure, perceived threats, and 
immigration policy attitudes. 
  
                                               
11
 An ordered logistic regression was estimated to test the determinants of contact, with controls for income, 
education, gender, place of birth, age, ideology, economic evaluations, prejudice toward Hispanics and Asians, 
multilingualism, and having immigrants as friends or family members.  Percent foreign born (at the zip code level) 
is a highly statistically significant predictor of reported contact (B=2.202, SE=.388, p=.000).  Post-estimation 
analysis of predicted probabilities reveals that going from the minimum value of percent foreign born (0%) to its 
maximum (66%) results in a .44 change in the likelihood of reporting the highest level of contact²by far the largest 
effect size of the predictors.  Additionally, negative affect toward Hispanics significantly increased the probability of 
reporting the highest level of contact (B=.612, SE=.256, p=.017).   
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 Overview of Experimental Studies 
Direct contact with immigrants is likely defined by sporadic, informal, and brief 
encounters within specific contexts (e.g., local supermarkets, retail stores, etc.) rather than 
prolonged and intimate settings (Hopkins, 2010). Of course, while we understand that language-
based exclusion can occur in formal, motivated interactions (e.g., see Hitlan et al., 2010), we 
believe that they are relatively uncommon experiences for most white Americans. Our 
assumption is reinforced by evidence that neighborhood and workplace segregation somewhat 
insulate immigrants from native-born Americans and limit their day-to-day visibility (Fischer, 
2003; Hellerstein & Neumark, 2005). Yet, exposure does occur, and we believe that it happens 
within a variety of limited interpersonal and indirect forms such as viewing signs or billboards in 
a foreign language, receiving official government documents in multiple languages, or even 
overhearing immigrants speaking to one another in their native tongue.   
In light of these considerations, we posit and experimentally manipulate two distinct 
mechanisms of exposure to a foreign language for white Americans. In Study 2, we explore how 
a brief, unexpected exposure to Spanish in an Internet chat room setting affects attitudes toward 
immigration. In Study 3, we explore the effects of an incidental, indirect exposure to a Spanish-
language website on attitudes. Consistent with our language-centered theory of cultural threat, 
we hypothesize that exposure to foreign laQJXDJHHJ6SDQLVKZLOOLQFUHDVHLQGLYLGXDOV¶
perceptions of the threats posed by immigrants and thus their support for anti-immigration 
policies.   
6WXG\7KH³6SDQLVK&KDW´([SHULPHQW 
7KH³6SDQLVK&KDW´H[SHULPHQWZDVGHVLJQHGWRDVVHVVWKHHIIHFWof brief, yet direct, 
FRQWDFWZLWKDIRUHLJQODQJXDJHVSHDNHUXSRQVXEMHFWV¶DWWLWXGHVWRZDUGLPPLJUDWLRQ7ZR
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hundred and twenty four undergraduates enrolled in introductory political science courses at 
Appalachian State University (ASU) were recruited to participate in the study. ASU served as an 
attractive choice for the study given the rapid growth of the Hispanic population in North 
Carolina over the past decade. Of the 224 students who participated, 91.5 percent identified 
themselves as Caucasian; 42.4 percent were female; and 98.7 percent indicated that they were 
born in the U.S. Ideology and party identification were roughly evenly distributed across the 
student sample. 
Experimental Design and Procedure 
Upon entering the lab, subjects were told that they were participating in a consumer 
UHVHDUFKVWXG\LQYHVWLJDWLQJSHRSOH¶VDWWLWXGHVWRZDUGFRPPHUFLDORUJRYHUQPHQWDOZHEVLWHV7R
support our cover story, the first section of the study asked participants to engage in a brief series 
of navigation tasks through the website of the Department of Housing and Urban Development.  
Participants were instructed that the purpose of the navigation tasks was simply to familiarize 
them with the configuration of the website and to give them a basis for evaluating its ³XVHU-
IULHQGOLQHVV´$IWHUFRPSOHWLQJWKHEULHIQDYLJDWLRQWDVNVSDUWLFLSDQWVZHUHWROGWKDWIRFXVJURXS
discussions constitute a large part of conducting consumer research and provide a very useful 
method of learning about consumer evaluations and preferences. Participants were told that our 
research was being conducted at multiple sites, and that they were going to participate in a brief 
on-OLQH³IRFXVJURXSVW\OH´FKDWZLWKDQRWKHUVWXGHQWSDUWLFLSDWLQJDWDVHSDUDWHXQLYHUVLW\,Q
reality, the chat-room discussant was a computer program with a set of scripted questions for our 
subjects. Subjects were told that Internet-based focus group forums are less costly than in-person 
groups, and that given time and cost constraints, the discussion session would be limited to a 
VKRUW³4XHVWLRQVDQG$QVZHUV´IRUPDW 
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All participants in the study were assigned the role of answering 6 questions posed by 
their chat-room partner. Participants in the control condition received 6 questions asked entirely 
in English.  For participants in the treatment group, 4 of the 6 questions contained substantial 
portions of the question in Spanish. For example, the first posted statement by the computerized 
FKDWGLVFXVVDQWLQWKHFRQWUROFRQGLWLRQZDV³just finished looking at some sites. what website 
did you search?´,QWKHWUHDWPHQWFRQGLWLRQKRZHYHUWKHVWDWHPHQWDSSHDUHGDV³just finished 
looking at some sites. qué website tuviste que buscar?´7KLVPDQLSXODWLRQZDVLQWHQGHGWR
simulate the type of brief, real-life encounter with someone who has limited English-language 
abilities.  
After completing the chat room questions and answers, as well as a series of subsequent 
deception bolstering filler questions, participants completed a target survey questionnaire. An 
experimental check revealed that less than 2% of the sample stated that they thought the 
experiment was explicitly about immigration, and no participants believed that the purpose of the 
experiment was to manipulate language exposure. Further, there was no significant correlation 
between experimental condition and the very small portion of students that reported thinking the 
experiment had something vaguely to do with immigration.    
To assess the impact of the treatment upon the perception of threat posed by immigrants, 
the questionnaire included 5 items that are conventional measures of material threat (Paxton & 
Mughan, 2006; Citrin et al., 1990), which formed a single scale ranging from 0 to 1 (1=high 
threat), with an inter-item reliability of Į . In addition, we included a 6-category collective 
cultural threat item derived from Sniderman and colleagues (2004) that asked respondents to 
LQGLFDWHWKHLUGHJUHHRIDJUHHPHQWZLWKWKHVWDWHPHQW³WKHVHGD\V,DPDIUDLGWKH$PHULFDQ
culture is threatened by immigUDWLRQ´Kigh score=strongly agree). We assess the impact of our 
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WUHDWPHQWRQVXEMHFWV¶SUHIHUHQFHVRYHUGLVWLQFWLPPLJUDWLRQSROLF\LWHPV)LUVWZHLQFOXGHDQ
item commonly used in the opinion literature that asked subjects to indicate their preferences 
regardinJZKHWKHUWKH³86*RYHUQPHQWVKRXOGVHHWRLWWKDWOHJDOLPPLJUDWLRQEHNHSWDWLWV
present leveOLQFUHDVHGRUGHFUHDVHG´KLJKVFRUH decreased immigration). Second, we asked 
subjects to indicate on a 5-point scale how important they believed it to be IRUWKH³86
government to work to return all illegal immigrants EDFNWRWKHLUKRPHFRXQWLHV´KLJKVFRUH= 
³([WUHPHO\,PSRUWDQW´7KLUGZHLQFOXGHGDQLWHPSHUWDLQLQJWRWKH2IILFLDO(QJOLVK/DQJXDJH
movement and asked participants to report how likely WKH\ZRXOGEHWRVXSSRUW³DVWDWHRUORFDO
ODZGHFODULQJ(QJOLVKDVWKH2IILFLDO/DQJXDJH"´7KLVLWHPKDGUHVSRQVHRSWLRQVUDQJLQJIURP
³H[WUHPHO\XQOLNHO\´WR³H[WUHPHO\OLNHO\´12 Fourth, we tapped opposition to bilingual 
government services by asking subjects to report their level of agreement with the statement 
³Jovernment agencies and offices interacting directly with citizens should make documents, 
forms, and signs available in languages other than English´7KLVLWHPKDGUHVSRQVHRSWLRQV
ranginJIURP³VWURQJO\DJUHH´WR³VWURQJO\GLVDJUHH´)LQDOO\DVDOLHQWLVVXHLQWKHLPPLJUDWLRQ
debate is the consumption of government services and receipt of welfare by immigrants; thus, we 
used the 1992 ANES item utilized by Citrin and colleagues (1997), for which subjects indicated 
KRZORQJWKH\WKRXJKW³LWshould take before immigrants that come to the U.S. to live are eligible 
for government services such as Medicaid, Food Stamps, and Welfare´7KLVYDULDEOHKDG
RUGHUHGUHVSRQVHRSWLRQVUDQJLQJIURP³HOLJLEOHLPPHGLDWHO\´WR³ZDLWRUPRUH\HDUV´ 
                                               
12
 The response categories for the 'HSRUW,OOHJDOV³QRWDWDOOLPSRUWDQW´³VOLJKWO\LPSRUWDQW´³PRGHUDWHO\LPSRUWDQW´
³TXLWHLPSRUWDQW´DQG³H[WUHPHO\LPSRUWDQW´2IILFLDO(QJOLVK³H[WUHPHO\XQOLNHO\´³SUHWW\XQOLNHO\´³VRPHZKDW
XQOLNHO\´³VRPHZKDWOLNHO\´³SUHWW\OLNHO\´DQG³H[WUHPHO\OLNHO\´), and Bilingual Government Services (³VWURQJO\
DJUHH´³DJUHH´³VOLJKWO\DJUHH´³VOLJKWO\GLVDJUHH´³GLVDJUHH´³VWURQJO\GLVDJUHH´) items contain no neutral 
midpoint.  The decision to exclude the neutral midpoint for these items was done to avoid its over-usage as a default 
response among those subjects reluctant to take a position and/or concerned with social desirability (e.g., see 
Krosnick, 1999).  7KHUHVSRQVHRSWLRQVIRU'HOD\HG*RYHUQPHQW%HQHILWVLWHPDUH³HOLJLEOHLPPHGLDWHO\´³ZDLW
\HDU´³ZDLW\HDUV´³ZDLW\HDUV´DQG³ZDLWRUPRUH\HDUV´ 
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  All models included controls for gender (1=male), income (1=combined annual income 
of subject and parents is more than $110,000), place of birth of VXEMHFWV¶parents (1=one or more 
RIVXEMHFW¶VSDUHQWVZDVERUQRXWVLGHRIWKH86, Spanish language ability (1=subject can speak 
6SDQLVK³YHU\ZHOO´, ideology (1=very conservative), and party identification (1=strong 
Republican). We also included measures of Right-Wing Authoritarianism (1=high authoritarian) 
and Social Dominance Orientation (1=high social dominance orientation) because both have 
been shown to be highly predictive of prejudice (e.g., see McFarland, 1998; Whitley, 1999), and 
the former has been shown to be directly predictive of economic and cultural threat and support 
for restrictive immigration policy (Hetherington and Weiler, 2009).  Given that our language-
centered conceptualization of cultural threat constitutes a distinct alternative to those based upon 
QRWLRQVRIWKUHDWWRWKH$PHULFDQLGHQWLW\ZHLQFOXGHGDFRQWUROIRUVWUHQJWKRIVXEMHFWV¶national 
identity (1=strong American identity) that was derived from the 4 item scale used by Sniderman 
and colleagues (2004).13 Finally, intergroup contact theory would suggest that having recurrent 
exposure to a foreign language within the context of having close friends who speak English as 
their second language should reduce the experience of foreign language-based threats. To control 
for this possibility, we included an item asking respondents about the percentage of close friends 
in their social network who were raised speaking a language other than English (1=100%).14 
                                               
13
 In addition to serving as a known predictor of immigration-related threats and policy attitudes, negative 
encounters with culturally unfamiliar outgroups may activate in-group/outgroup distinctions, thus enhancing the 
strength and salience of American identity among Whites. This activation of national identity, in turn, could mediate 
the link between foreign language exposure and perceived threats and policy attitudes. We tested for this possibility; 
neither the Spanish Chat nor the Web Spanish WUHDWPHQWVH[HUWHGDVLJQLILFDQWHIIHFWRQVXEMHFWV¶UHSRUWHGVWUHQJWK
of national identity.  
14
 Another distinct possibility that reflects an integration of intergroup contact theory into our acculturation 
framework is that individuals who either speak Spanish or another foreign language, as well as those who have 
friends that are ESL speakers, might be less threatened by foreign language exposure. In Study 2, we tested for these 
possibilities by interacting the Spanish Chat treatment with Spanish language ability and separately with our 
measure of friendship with ESL speakers. In Study 3, we interacted the Web Spanish manipulation with ability to 
speak a foreign language and friendship with ESL speakers.  Across both studies, individuals who spoke Spanish or 
another foreign language were not differentially impacted by the foreign language manipulations relative to those 
with limited language abilities or who are friends with ESL speakers. 
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Given that 91.5 percent of the participants in our study were White, and that Black and Hispanic 
participants each constituted less than 2 percent of the sample, race was not included as a 
necessary control. For ease of interpretation, all independent variables were recoded to range 
from 0 to 1. 
A large portion of the empirical research on opinion toward immigration explores the 
impact of various perceived threats on immigration policy attitudes; within existing research the 
causal chain is theorized to move from perceived threat to policy attitude. In the present study, 
we aim to go further back in the causal process²our main hypothesis is that foreign language 
H[SRVXUHH[SHULHQFHVVXFKDVRXU³6SDQLVKFKDW´PDQLSXODWLRQZLOOLQFUHDVHWKHSHUFHSWLRQRI
immigration-related threats, and by doing so, will heighten support for anti-immigration policies. 
In other words, we hypothesize that these threat variables²particularly perceived threat to the 
American culture²ZLOOPHGLDWHWKHLPSDFWRIRXUWUHDWPHQWRQVXEMHFWV¶LPPLJUDWLRQSROLF\
preferences. To test these hypotheses, for each threat variable and policy dependent variable, we 
estimated a structural equation model that simultaneously regressed the threat mediator on the 
treatment and control variables and regressed the policy variable on the treatment, threat 
mediator, and controls. Due to the ordinal nature of our cultural threat item and dependent 
variables, we used ordered probit link functions for these models and estimated the parameters 
using weighted least squares in Mplus®. 
Results 
   Table II presents the results for the effect of the Spanish chat manipulation on the 
perceived cultural and material threats posed by immigrants, and Table III presents the mediated 
effects of the treatment on immigration policy preferences.  Beginning with Table II, as 
hypothesized, participants who received the Spanish chat manipulation reported significantly 
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higher levels of perceived threat than participants in the control condition.  To get a sense of the 
magnitude of the impact of our treatment on these different threat variables, we estimated 
predicted probabilities for the cultural threat model and predicted values for the material threat 
model.  Because our cultural threat item is an ordinal variable, we chose to estimate the predicted 
probability of agreeing with the statement that the American culture is threatened by 
immigration.15  Even after including a multitude of control variables (held at their means), we 
find that the probability of perceiving threats to American culture from immigration goes from 
0.40 among those in the control condition to 0.54 for those receiving the Spanish chat treatment.  
The difference in predicted probabilities reveals that in addition to exerting a statistically 
significant effect, our treatment also has a substantively meaningful effect; exposure to the 
Spanish chat manipulation resulted in a 14 percent change on the scale of the dependent variable.  
The impact of the chat manipulation on material threats, however, was less noteworthy.  
Holding all controls at their means, the predicted value on the material threat scale among those 
in the control condition was 0.51 compared to 0.55 for those receiving the treatment. Thus, in 
addition to exerting only a marginally significant effect, moving from the control condition to the 
treatment condition also resulted in a less sizeable movement on the 0 to 1 scale of our material 
threat variable. From a theoretical standpoint, the difference in the strength and size of the 
impact of our treatment across the two threat variables makes sense given the stronger 
connection of language to the cultural rather than economic domain.  
Moving on to the mediated effects of our treatment on immigration policy preferences, 
Table III reveals that the Spanish chat manipulation, through its effect on the perception of 
cultural threat, exerted consistent and significant indirect or mediated effects across the 5 policy 
                                               
15
 We estimate the predicted probability for being above the third response category²that is, UHSRUWLQJ³VOLJKWO\
DJUHH´³DJUHH´RU ³VWURQJO\DJUHH´ 
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items.  Interestingly, and not unexpectedly, the Spanish chat manipulation exerted the strongest 
indirect effects on the two policy items that deal explicitly with language²Official English and 
Bilingual Government Services.  Turning to material threat, the results in Table III show mostly 
nonsignificant indirect effects of the Spanish chat treatment on policy attitudes through the 
perception of the material threats posed by immigrants. In total, the results of the mediation 
analyses reveal that the main pathway by which our interpersonal language manipulation leads to 
anti-immigration policy preferences is through its effect on the perceived cultural, rather than 
material, impacts of immigration.  
 The overall findings from the Spanish chat experiment are substantively important for 
several reasons. First and foremost, they reveal that real interpersonal foreign language exposure, 
particularly when it serves as a barrier to communication, however informal, has important 
consequences for immigration related attitudes. The findings from our experiment suggest that 
we revise our thinking about the stark dichotomy between realistic, economic threats and 
symbolic, identity-RULHQWHGWKUHDWV7KHHYLGHQFHIURPRXU³6SDQLVK&KDW´H[SHULPHQW
combined with the survey results from Study 1, suggest that real, yet non-economic factors, such 
as personal contact with non-English speakers and foreign language exposure are important 
sources of immigration policy attitudes. Moreover, we show that our individual-level language 
manipulation operates by enhancing the perceptions of the threats posed by immigrants, 
particularly collective-level threats to American culture. While most studies typically start with 
cognitively-based perceived threats, our study demonstrates that actual intergroup experiences 
can precede the formation of immigration-UHODWHGEHOLHIVDQGWKXVVHUYHDVDPRUH³XS-VWUHDP´
influence RQWKH³GRZQ-VWUHDP´IRUPDWLRQRILPPLJUDWLRQSROLF\DWWLWXGHV 
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 As discussed earlier, residential and occupational segregation often limit the frequency 
and intimacy of contact between native-born Americans and recent immigrants. Given this 
segregation, foreign language exposure in ethnically diverse local settings may often occur 
through impersonal and indirect mediums. Such experiences could include observing business 
signs and billboards in Spanish as one drives by Hispanic enclaves within their town, observing 
signs in Spanish at retail stores such as Home Depot or Wal-Mart, or even overhearing others 
speaking Spanish in public places. Indeed, Hopkins, Tran, and Williamson (2010) find that 
subtle, brief, and incidental exposure to Spanish language can operate as a powerful implicit cue, 
activating opposition to immigration.  ,QWKHIROORZLQJ³:HE6SDQLVK´H[SHULPHQWZHVHWRXWWR
explore the impact of these more subtle types of impersonal, incidental, and brief foreign 
language exposures on the perception of threat and support for restrictive immigration policies. 
6WXG\7KH³:HE6SDQLVK´([SHULPHQW 
 The Web Spanish experiment differed from the Spanish chat experiment in one important 
way. Instead of relying upon a foreign language manipulation delivered within a direct, 
interpersonal communication context, the language treatment in this study involved a more 
subtle manipulation, namely an unexpected, incidental, and brief exposure to a Spanish language 
website. This manipulation was intended to simulate real world exposure situations, such as 
passing by signs in Spanish or the emergence of Spanish signs at a familiar retail store. 
Experimental Design and Procedure 
Undergraduate students at Stony Brook University were recruited to participate in the 
study for extra credit in the various political science courses they were enrolled in. Of the 184 
students who participated in the study, 46.7 percent were White, 34.2 percent identified 
themselves as Asian/Pacific Islander, and 18.9 percent were Black, Hispanic, Middle Eastern, or 
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another ethnicity. Gender, partisanship, and ideology were roughly evenly distributed across the 
sample and the two experimental conditions. 
As in Study 2, subjects were led to believe they were participating in consumer research. 
Participants were told that they were going to be randomly assigned to assess a website (e.g., in 
this case, the U.S. Housing and Urban Development website), and that they were going to be 
given 3 navigation search tasks to familiarize themselves with that website. The HUD website 
was chosen because at the time of the study (spring semester of 2009), the English and Spanish 
versions of the website were nearly identical in color, format, and general appearance. For the 
first navigation task, all participants, regardless of condition, were asked to locate information 
DERXW³:KDWLVD+8'KRPH"´3DUWLFLSDQWVZHUHLQVWUXFWHGWKDWWKHSXUSRVHRIWKHQDYLJDWLRQ
was simply foUWKHPWRJHWDIHHOIRUWKHZHEVLWHVRWKDWWKH\FRXOGHYDOXDWHLWV³XVHU-
IULHQGOLQHVV´SDUWLFLSDQWVZHUHLQVWUXFWHGWRWDNHQRORQJHUWKDQPLQXWHVIRUHDFKQDYLJDWLRQ
task. After completing the first navigation task, participants closed the HUD website, and 
returned to the main experimental page, where they were asked two questions about their 
findings. After these questions, they were then sent on a second navigation task, asked questions 
about their navigation findings, and then sent on a third and final navigation task.    
The main treatment of the study involved varying what occurred during the third 
navigation task; for those participants in the control condition, the third task was the same as the 
previous two, which requested subjects to look for specific information on the HUD website.  
)RUSDUWLFLSDQWVLQWKHWUHDWPHQWFRQGLWLRQKRZHYHUVXEMHFWVZHUH³DFFLGHQWDOO\´GLUHFWHGWRWKH
6SDQLVKODQJXDJHYHUVLRQRIWKH+8'ZHEVLWHWRVHDUFKIRULQIRUPDWLRQDERXW³KRZRQHPLJKW
apply for a HUD grant.´$WWKHWRSRIWKH6SDQLVKODQJXDJH+8'ZHEVLWHWKHUHZDVDQ³(Q
,QJOHV´EXWWRQWRFOLFNWRUHWXUQWRWKH(QJOLVKVLWHWKHYDVWPDMRULW\RIVWXG\SDUWLFLSDQWVLQWKH
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treatment condition located this button within a matter of 10 seconds or less. Thus, we believe 
that our treatment truly involved a very incidental and brief foreign language exposure. After 
completing the navigation tasks, all participants answered a series of deception bolstering filler 
questions and then completed a target survey questionnaire. Similar to Study 2, less than 2% of 
the sample reported believing the study had anything remotely to do with immigration, and no 
study participants reported believing the purpose of the study was about language use.   
To assess the effect of our web Spanish treatment on the perceived threats of 
immigration, we included the same 5 material threat items from the prior experimental study 
Į 7KHDWWLWXGHVXUYH\DGPLQLVWHUHGWRVXEMHFWVLQWKLVVWXG\GLGQRWFRQWDLQWKHVLQJOH
cultural threat item contained in Study 2; however, the survey did include 3 items from the 
language sub-scale of the assimilationist threat scale (Paxton & Mughan, 2006). Paxton and 
Mughan (2006) argue that in the U.S. case, cultural threat should be conceptualized and properly 
measured as resentful perceptions that immigrants are failing to assimilate.  The language 
subscale of the assimilationist threats scale taps the degree of support for staunch adoption and 
usage of the English language by immigrants.16  These three items were combined into a single 
VXPPDWLYHVFDOHĮ DQGUHFRGHGWRUDQJHIURPWR KLJKODQJXDJHWKUHDW 
 To test the effect of our treatment on immigration policy preferences, we also included 
two items utilized in Study 2, namely the question regarding (1) preferences over the amount of 
immigration and (2) the question tapping support for the U.S. government working to deport all 
illegal immigrants back to their home countries. Given the ethnically diverse nature of our 
sample, as well as our primary interest in the effects of foreign language exposure on native born 
                                               
16
 :HLQFOXGHGWKHIROORZLQJLWHPVIURPWKHODQJXDJHVXEVFDOHRIWKHDVVLPLODWLRQLVWWKUHDWVFDOH³,PPLJUDQWV
need to communicate effectively in English in their daily liYHV´³,PPLJUDQWVGRQ¶WKDYHWRVSHDNLQ(QJOLVKLQ
SXEOLFSODFHVDOORIWKHWLPH´DQG:KHQLQWKHFRPSDQ\RI$PHULFDQVLPPLJUDQWVQHHGWRVSHDNWRHDFKRWKHULQ
(QJOLVKHYHQLILWLVHDVLHUIRUWKHPWRXVHDFRPPRQQDWLYHODQJXDJH´7KHUHZHUH ordered response options for 
WKHVHWKUHHLWHPVUDQJLQJIURP³VWURQJO\DJUHH´WR³VWURQJO\GLVDJUHH´ 
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white Americans, our models included interactions of the dichotomous web Spanish treatment 
YDULDEOHZLWKDUDFHGXPP\YDULDEOH7KHUDFHYDULDEOHZDVFRGHG³´IRUSDUWLFLSDQWVIURPD 
PLQRULW\HWKQLFJURXS³´IRUZKLWHSDUWLFLSDQWV$VLQ6WXG\DOOPRGHOVLQFOXGHGFRQWUROVIRU
gender, income, place of birth of parents, ability to speak a foreign language, ideology, party 
identification, RWA, SDO, friendship with ESL speakers, and national identity (the coding of 
each variables is the same as in Study 2).  
Due to the ordinal nature of the policy variables (similar to Study 2) we estimated 
structural equation models to discern the direct effect of our web Spanish treatment on the two 
threat variables and the direct and indirect effect of our treatment on the two policy variables 
through each of the two threat variables. As before, we used ordered probit link functions for 
these models and estimated the parameters using weighted least squares in the software package 
Mplus®.  In addition to assessing the conditional marginal effect of the treatment on the 
perceptions of material and language-based assimilation threats, our modeling procedure allows 
us to explore whether the impact of the treatment on immigration policy preferences is mediated 
by threat perceptions. All independent variables were recoded to range from 0 to 1. 
Results 
The results displayed in Table II (second column) reveal that, among Whites, incidental 
and brief exposure to the Spanish-language-version of the HUD website significantly increased 
the perception that immigrants pose language-assimilation and material threats relative to those 
in the control condition. The significant and negative interaction terms indicate that the marginal 
effect of the treatment, when assessed among non-white minority study participants, is 
significantly attenuated.17  To illustrate this effect more clearly, among white subjects, the 
                                               
17
 One possible concern is that there is heterogeneity among distinct groups of non-White subjects. For example, 
Hispanics may react differently to a Spanish-language manipulation than African American or Asian subjects. To 
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difference in the predicted value on the language threat scale when moving from the control to 
the treatment condition (holding all other variables at their means) resulted in a change from 0.28 
to 0.40, which represents a 12 percent change on the scale of the dependent variable.  In contrast, 
among non-white subjects, the change in perceived language threat in moving from the control 
0.29 to the treatment condition 0.32 produced a slight difference of 0.03.  Turning to material 
threats, the predicted value of material threat among Whites, holding all else at their means, 
moves from 0.42 for those in the control group to 0.49 for those receiving the web Spanish 
treatment.  In comparison, the change in predicted value among non-white participants resulted 
in a movement from 0.44 to 0.49.  In line with the findings from Study 2, these results reveal that 
exposure to an unfamiliar language²this time in an impersonal and incidental manner²enhance 
the perception of the threats posed by immigrants but impacts cultural concerns to a much larger 
extent than material concerns. In contrast to existing work employing a weaker form of 
impersonal and incidental exposure to the Spanish language (Hopkins et al., 2010), the effect of 
the Web Spanish treatment on the attitudes of white subjects operated in a direct, unconditional, 
fashion. 
 Next, we turn to our analysis of the mediated effects of the web Spanish treatment on the 
immigration policy preferences of white subjects (see the bottom half of Table III).  First, among 
Whites we see that the web Spanish treatment failed to exert any significant direct effects on 
immigration policy preferences.  The treatment, however, did exert significant indirect effects on 
support for deporting illegal immigrants through its impact on the perception of language and 
material threat, though the indirect effect was only marginally significant in the later case.  For 
                                                                                                                                                       
address this concern, we re-ran each moderated regression equation excluding the 11 Hispanic subjects from the 
analysis. We find that the results remain fundamentally unchanged. We also re-ran the analyses on subsamples of 
White-only subjects and find that the direction and significance of the treatment remained positive and statistically 
significant. 
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preferences over the amount of immigration, the results reveal that, while in the predicted 
direction, the treatment failed to exert significant indirect effects through perceived 
assimilationist or material threats.  We should note, however, that these indirect effects are 
marginally significant in one-tailed, as compared to two-tailed, hypothesis tests.  In sum, and 
similar to the findings from Study 2,  the results from these mediational analyses point toward 
culturally-oriented concerns²LQWKLVFDVHLPPLJUDQWV¶DGRSWLRQDQGXVDJHRIWKH(QJOLVK
language²as a prominent medium through which real, yet subtle, exposure to foreign language 
might influence immigration policy preferences. 
Conclusion 
 The contrasting of realistic, economic threats and symbolic, identity-based threats as 
competing explanations for opposition to immigration has been useful in furthering our 
understanding of anti-immigrant sentiment. However, this framework has led to the implicit 
equation of cultural threat with the symbolic and contributed to the underdevelopment of 
alternative bases for cultural threat. In this paper, we argue that real, intercultural contact and 
exposure to unfamiliar cultural stimuli, such as a foreign language, generates tangible, yet non-
economic, threats to the individual. Namely, our theoretical perspective emphasizes how the 
increased prevalence of linguistically unassimilated immigrants ZLWKLQRQH¶VORFDOHQYLURQPHQW
and the resulting presence of language barriers to the completion of basic everyday tasks and 
social interactions, FKDOOHQJHDFRUHDVSHFWRI$PHULFDQV¶VRFLDODQGFXOWXUDOFRPSHWHQFLHVZLWK
their surrounding environment.  It is through this presumed mechanism that we believe exposure 
to unfamiliar language enhances the perceived threats of immigration and thus leads to increased 
political opposition to immigration. 
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In Study 1, we demonstrated that personal contact with non-English speakers increased 
the likelihood that Whites feel culturally threatened, which in turn, increases support for 
restricting immigration levels and deporting illegal immigrants. We feel that this study is an 
improvement over previous research that relies on indirect measures of contact such as the local 
immigrant population size. Studies 2 and 3 compliment our survey-based findings by 
demonstrating that two distinct forms of exposure to the Spanish language directly cause 
increased feelings of threat, which increases support for anti-immigrant policies. In addition to 
demonstrating tangible bases for the experience of cultural threat, these studies add to our 
understanding of the dynamics underlying opposition to immigration by identifying real 
experiential factors that causally precede threat perceptions.  
Of course, we are the first to admit that the results presented in support of our realistic, 
language-centered conceptualization of cultural threat are far from perfect. We acknowledge that 
the results presented in Studies 2 and 3 relied upon undergraduate university students from the 
east coast. More importantly, while demonstrating links between foreign language and opinion 
on immigration, the evidence does not directly observe the micro-level mechanisms theorized to 
link language exposure to attitudes.  Yet, these limitations aside, the evidence presented across 
the three studies does take a solid first step broadening our conceptualization of cultural threat to 
LQFOXGH³UHDO´LQGLYLGXDO-level experiences. We believe that an important step for future research 
in this area would be to substantiate the mechanisms stipulated in our theory linking exposure to 
unfamiliar cultural stimuli to opinion on immigration. Such mechanisms could include the 
experience of emotional distress or disorientation, as well as frustration or anger in response to 
experienced barriers to effective interpersonal communication and exchange. 
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Table I.                             The Effect of Contact on Perceived Cultural Threat  
                                                       And Immigration Policy Preferences 
 
 
Cultural Threat  Amount of Immigration Deport Illegals 
Contact  .304* (.123)  -.150 (.106) .106 (.123) 
Cultural Threat  - - - - - -  .369*** (.034) .415*** (.040) 
Education  -.612*** (.154)  -.292* (.127) -.033 (.151) 
Income  -.153 (.172)  .068 (.136) .136 (.167) 
Age  .009*** (.002)  -.001 (.002) -.008*** (.002) 
Gender  .008 (.069)  -.080 (.058) .069 (.068) 
Born in U.S.  .263 (.176)  .013 (.148) -.051 (.162) 
Unemployed  .181 (.237)  .142 (.217) .211 (.280) 
Party ID  .307*** (.096)  -.023 (.080) .017 (.096) 
Ideology  1.011*** (.182)  .382* (.149) 1.086*** (.191) 
Sociotropic Evaluations  .578*** (.143)  .329** (.117) .107 (.143) 
Pocketbook Evaluations  .102 (.161)  .175 (.135) .093 (.153) 
Hispanic Affect  1.149*** (.185)  .448** (.160) 1.062*** (.204) 
Asian Affect  .891*** (.201)  .059 (.162) .041 (.199) 
Multilingual  -.197* (.079)  .011 (.064) -.016 (.078) 
Immigrant Friends & Family  -.016 (.082)  -.173** (.066) -.098 (.078) 
Constant  2.116*** (.328)    1.415*** (.032) 
Thresholds         
   Cut 1   - - - - - -  .099 (.266) - - - - - - 
   Cut 2  - - - - - -  1.387*** (.268) - - - - - - 
N  1,686  1,686 1,680 
Indirect Effects         
Contact     .112* (.047) .126* (.052) 
Notes:  For all models, because Mplus treats categorical dependent variables as latent variables, the coefficient 
estimates represent the standard deviation unit change in the latent variable underlying the dichotomous or ordered 
response dependent variable associated with a unit change in the independent variable.  The coefficient for the indirect 
effect of contact represents the estimated effect of contact on each policy dependent variable as mediated by its effect 
on cultural threat.  Reported p-values are based on two-tailed hypothesis tests, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
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Table II.     The Effect of Experimental Treatments on Perceived Threats of Immigration 
 
Study 2: 
Spanish Chat Experiment 
 Study 3: 
Web Spanish Experiment 
 
Cultural 
Threat 
Material 
Threat  
Language 
Threat 
Material 
Threat 
Experimental Treatment .347* .040  .112** .067* 
 (.156) (.024)  (.045) (.034) 
Race Dummy (0=white) - - - - - -  .038 .022 
 
   
(.053) (.034) 
Treatment x Race - - - - - -  -.147* -.115* 
 
   (.065) (.049) 
Gender -.044 -.010  .047 .044 
 (.155) (.025)  (.033) (.026) 
Income .566 .021  -.110 -.045 
 (.336) (.051)  (.059) (.047) 
Parent(s) Born  Outside of US -.203 -.099*  -.065 -.085** 
 (.278) (.040)  (.040) (.027) 
Spanish Language Ability -.599* -.049  .020 -.015 
 (.266) (.042)  (.045) (.033) 
Friends with ESL Speakers -.412 -.093*  .011 -.121** 
 (.335) (.047)  (.064) (.046) 
Ideology -.239 -.038  .034 -.049 
 (.431) (.069)  (.076) (.059) 
Party ID .448 .065  .019 .119* 
 
(.386) (.063) 
 
(.064) (.050) 
RWA 2.30*** .235**  .220* .356*** 
 
(.556) (.088) 
 
(.102) (.065) 
SDO 1.61*** .392***  .194* .330*** 
 
(.482) (.066) 
 
(.090) (.067) 
National Identity  1.491** .219**  .070 .158*** 
 
(.541) (.085) 
 
(.065) (.048) 
N 224  184 
Notes: For the Cultural Threat model, because Mplus treats categorical dependent variables as latent variables, the 
coefficient estimates represent the standard deviation unit change in the latent variable underlying the ordered 
response dependent variable associated with a unit change in the independent variable.  For all remaining models 
with continuous dependent variables, entries are unstandardized regression coefficients. Reported p-values are based 
on two-tailed hypothesis tests, S*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001  
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Table III.                                 The Mediated Effects of Foreign Language Treatments on Immigration Policy Preferences  
I.  Spanish Chat Treatment   
 
Threat Mediator 
 
Immigration Policy Item 
 
Cultural threat 
 Amount of 
Immigration Deport Illegals Official English Bilingual Services Delayed Benefits 
Direct Effect .347* (.156)  -.069 (.159) -.110 (.153) .145 (.147) .052 (.145) .129 (.150) 
Indirect Effect    .087 (.045) .105* (.050) .164* (.073) .145* (.067) .084 (.043) 
 Material Threat          
  
Direct Effect .040 (.024)  -.047 (.156) -.082 (.147) .228 (.151) .123 (.152) .142 (.148) 
Indirect Effect    .065 (.041) .077 (.046) .080 (.049) .074 (.045) .072 (.046) 
II.  Web Spanish Treatment             
   
 Language Threat  Amount of Immigration Deport Illegals 
Direct Effect .122** (.045)  .106 (.232) .425 (.271) 
Indirect Effect    .067 (.048) .120* (.056) 
 Material Threat      
Direct Effect .067* (.034)  .089 (.230) .390 (.248) 
Indirect Effect    .084 (.052)  (.083) 
Notes:  Entries are the estimated direct effect of the experimental treatments on the threat mediators, and the direct and indirect effects of the experimental treatments 
on the policy dependent variables.  The estimates are based upon results from structural equation models estimated in Mplus.  The results for the Web Spanish 
treatment (Study 3) displayed in the bottom half of the table are the direct and indirect effects of the treatment on perceived threats and immigration policy preferences 
among White subjects only.  All models of the policy dependent variables included controls for gender, income, race (SWXG\RQO\ELUWKSODFHRIVXEMHFW¶VSDUHQWV
Spanish language ability, friends with ESL speakers, ideology, party ID, RWA, SDO, and National Identity.  Reported p-values are based upon two-tailed hypothesis 
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